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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. STRINGHAM, : 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
Case No. 960426-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STRINGHAM 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD. 
THEFT AND ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL 
ACTIVITY. 
Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a criminal jury trial the threshold issue of 
statutory interpretation is decided as a matter of law. See 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d at 1313 (Utah App. 1993). With regard 
to the facts, the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from them are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. This Court will reverse 
a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of the court's 
interpretation of the statute, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. See State v. Johnson,, 821 
P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE AGENT FROM THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidentiary rulings are 
reviewed under a deferential clear error standard. Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 1991). 
Preservation in Trial Court: The above stated issue was 
preserved for the record in the court below. See Record at pp. 
1056-1060. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE CRIMINAL 
INTENT REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Standard of Review: An appeal challenging the refusal to 
give a jury instruction presents a question of law for which 
the reviewing court grants no particular deference. Ong Int' 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp. , 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
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Further, because the general rule is that an accurate 
instruction on the basic elements of an offense is essential, 
failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error 
that can never be considered harmless. State v. Souza, 846 
P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah App. 1993). 
Preservation in Trial Court: The above stated issue was 
preserved for the record in the court below. See Record at 
366-368. 
IV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT FIND THAT ISSUE III WAS 
PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT, 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Standard of Review: The performance and prejudice prongs 
of ineffectiveness of counsel claims involve mixed questions 
of law and fact which are reviewed de novo. United States v. 
Owens, 882 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative case law in this matter includes Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 which sets forth the elements that must 
be proven in order to find a defendant guilty of 
communications fraud. A copy of this statute is attached as 
Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 sets forth the elements which 
must be proven in order to find a defendant guilty of theft 
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and is also determinative in this matter. That statute reads 
as follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
It is a defense to a charge of theft that 
the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to 
the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the 
property or service honestly believing that 
the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
In addition, the case of State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 
(Utah, 1990) sets forth the requisite mental state for a 
conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant/appellant, Robert W. Stringham, was charged 
with one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, 
a second degree felony, three counts of communications fraud, 
all second degree felonies, and twelve counts of theft, six of 
which were second degree felonies, five third degree felonies 
and one Class A misdemeanor. (Record at 1-5). These charges 
arose out of Mr. Stringham's employment with Assessment and 
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Psychotherapy Associates ("APA"), and arose out of alleged 
activities which took place between 1990 and 1992. It was 
alleged that Mr. Stringham had performed services for APA, and 
that he assigned income which he received from those services 
to his wife's sole proprietorship, GS Consulting. This was 
allegedly done in order to avoid reporting income to his 
pension plan administrator so that the amount of his pension 
would not be decreased. 
It was further alleged that Mr. Stringham assigned hours 
which he worked, and which he was purportedly paid a salary, 
to his wife, Gail Stringham, who was then paid for the work 
that the defendant performed, and that in 1991 the defendant 
had taken over the financial aspects of APA and was therefore 
in a position to write himself checks in excess of the amount 
which he and his wife were owed. 
This matter went to trial on or about January 17, 1996. 
Following a three day jury trial, on or about January 19, 
1996, the defendant was found guilty of all counts. A Motion 
to Arrest Judgment was filed in the district court on or about 
May, 31 1996, (R. at 457). This motion was denied. A Motion 
to Reduce Charges to the next lower degree under § 76-3-402 
was granted. Mr. Stringham was sentenced to the Utah State 
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Prison for an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years 
on Counts I-IV. On Count V the defendant was sentenced to the 
Utah County Jail for a period of six months, and on Counts VI-
XVI the defendant was sentenced to the Utah County Jail for a 
period of one year- These sentences were ordered to run 
concurrent. The sentence was suspended and the defendant was 
placed on probation for a period of 36 months upon the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. The defendant was ordered to enter into an agreement 
with the Adult Probation and Parole Department and comply 
strictly with the terms of probation. 
2. The defendant was ordered to make himself available to 
the Adult Probation and Parole and to the court when requested 
to do so. 
3. The defendant was ordered to not violate the laws of 
the United States, the State of Utah, the laws of any state or 
any municipality. 
4. The defendant was ordered to serve 45 days in the Utah 
County Jail and be given credit for "good time." Defendant was 
ordered to report to the Utah County Jail on Sunday, July 14, 
1996 at 8:00 a.m. to begin serving his jail sentence. 
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5. The defendant was ordered to pay a monthly supervision 
fee of $30.00 at the discretion of Adult Probation and Parole. 
6. The defendant was ordered to complete 500 hours of 
alternative community service within 18 months. 
7. The defendant was ordered to pay a fine in the amount 
of $2,000 or complete 400 hours of alternative community 
service. The defendant was ordered to pay a surcharge in the 
amount of $1,700. 
8. The defendant is not allowed to be in any position of 
financial trust or have any other fiduciary responsibilities. 
(R. at 474c). 
The defendant, Mr. Stringham, completed his jail term in 
August of 1996. A timely appeal was filed in this matter on or 
about June 20, 1996. (R. at 478). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 30, 1993, the defendant/appellant, 
Robert W. Stringham was charged in a 16 count information. (R. 
at 5). The Information was amended on or about April 4, 1994 
charging him with one count of engaging in a pattern of 
unlawful activity in violation of §76-10-1602 of the Utah 
Criminal Code; three counts of communications fraud in 
violation of §76—10-1801 of the Utah Criminal Code, and 
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twelve counts of theft all in violation of §76-6-404,412 of 
the Utah Criminal Code. (R. at 49). These charges arose out 
of Mr. Stringham's employment by Assessment and Psychotherapy 
Associates (hereinafter referred to as "APA"). 
Mr. Stringham began working for APA in 1990 (R. at 1218) . 
APA was run and operated by Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and her 
then husband Dr. Curtis Reisinger. APA also employed a Mr. Art 
Marshall and a Ms. Julia Martinez, who at that time was 
married to Mr. Marshall.1 In early May of 1989 the above named 
parties met with Gail and Bob Stringham and entered into an 
oral employment agreement. (R. at 1218). Although Dr. 
Stringham was already employed by APA at that time the 
agreement expanded her employment and further employed Mr. 
Stringham as follows. It was agreed that Gail Stringham would 
open a satellite office of APA for the purpose of conducting 
drug and alcohol counseling. (R. at 1218, 19). Dr. Stringham's 
sole proprietorship, GS Consulting would act as operator of 
the counseling business and further, Robert Stringham was 
hired as a salaried employee to help get the office going and 
act in a managerial capacity. See R. at 1218. Mrs. Stringham 
1
 During the time period when these activities allegedly 
occurred, Dr. Reisinger divorced her husband and married Art 
Marshall. At the time of trial Dr. Reisinger and Mr. Marshall were 
husband and wife. 
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was to continued to be paid for her hourly work. It was 
further agreed that there would be a profit split of 60/40 
with 60% of the profits going to GS Consulting and 40% to APA. 
Id. at 412. Further, APA was to pay Robert Stringham a salary 
of $400.00 per month. Id. Under this agreement, APA would 
distribute three checks each month to the Stringhams. One was 
for Gale Stringham's salary, one was for Robert Stringham's 
salary, and one representing the 60% profit to GS Consulting. 
(R. at 1218, 19). Eventually the agreement between GS 
Consulting and APA changed so that 75% of the profit was going 
to GS Consulting, and 25% to APA. (R. at 1218. 19). However, 
after the initial agreement, while the drug and alcohol 
counseling was beginning to get underway, APA paid GS 
Consulting a draw of $600 per month which represented draws 
against future revenue. (R. at 878) . This draw against future 
revenue was eventually increased to $800.00 per month. (R. at 
880). Dr. Stringham's salary was further increased from $15.00 
per hour to $25.00 per hour. (R. at 1220). Although the above 
facts do not seem to be in dispute, the agreements between the 
parties in this matter changed numerous times over the next 
two years and there is very little agreement between the 
parties as to how the agreement exactly changed. 
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Unfortunately, none of the agreements between the parties were 
ever reduced to writing. (R. at 952, 969) . 
According the Art Marshall the first agreement was as set 
out above. Mr. Stringham was to get $400.00 per month for 
administrative fees and some clinical services. Dr. Stringham 
was to get her regular salary and GS Consulting would get 
$600.00 per month as a draw against future profits. (R. at 876 
and 77). Dr. Stringham seemed to agree with this in her 
testimony although it is not clear from her whether the 
$600.00 per month started being paid at that time or some time 
later. (R. at 1218) . According to Mr. Marshall, in September 
of 1991 the draw increased from $600.00 per month to $800.00 
per month (R. at 880) . This does not appear to be disputed 
although Dr. Stringham adds to this that her salary also 
increased at that time. (R. at 1220). 
In August of 1991 both parties agree that there were 
significant changes in the agreement between them, however, 
exactly what those changes were are in dispute. By that time 
GS Consulting had taken over some of the bookkeeping services 
for APA (R. at 1220). These services were performed by both 
Mr. and Dr. Stringham. Id. Because of this it was agreed that 
Mr. Stringham would continue to be paid his salary of $400.00 
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per month and GS Consulting would be paid additional money 
each month for the extra services. Although the parties agree 
that the additional money was for bookkeeping and that it was 
paid to GS Consulting, they disagree on the amount and who the 
money was for. Mr. Marshall testified that this money was 
actually part of Mr. Stringham's salary, and that the amount 
was $700.00 per month. (R. at 888). It appears from Mr. 
Marshall's testimony that he believed that the draw against 
future profitability would no longer be paid as of this time. 
He says in his mind it was clear that the only payments were 
to be the total of $1,100.00 per month for Mr. Stringham, 
although $700.00 of that was paid to GS Consulting, and Dr. 
Stringham's regular salary. (R. at 973, 989). Mr. Marshall 
further testified that it was his understanding that Mr. 
Stringham would not be paid for any additional work he may 
perform. The $1,100.00 was to cover everything. (R. at 973). 
Mr. and Dr. Stringham's understanding of the agreement was 
somewhat different. Dr. Stringham testified that it was their 
understanding that Mr. Stringham would continue to receive his 
$400.00 per month salary. In addition to that GS Consulting 
would continue to receive $600.00 per month as a draw against 
future profitability and an additional $300.00 per month for 
11 
bookkeeping services for a total of $900.00 per month as 
opposed to $700.00. (R. at 1223). She further testified that 
this amount increased again in October of 1991 to $1,600.00 
per month for GS Consulting because she had taken over more 
administrative matters. Id. Further, according to Art 
Marshall, in August of 1991 APA paid Mr. Stringham a lump sum 
payment of $5,000.00 to cover additional work he had performed 
for APA over the past year without compensation (R. at 886). 
Dr. Stringham however testified that the $5,000.00 was paid to 
GS Consulting and was not for work necessarily performed by 
Mr. Stringham but was for work performed by GS Consulting. 
Further, according to Dr. Stringham even after this payment 
they were still owed money by APA (R. at 1233 and 34). Mr. 
Marshall also believed contrary to the Stringhams, that Mr. 
Stringham would not receive additional compensation for 
clinical work. (R. at 973). By this time the Stringhams were 
also handling the payroll for APA. Although Mr. Marshall would 
sign all checks it appears that most checks were prepared by 
Mr. Stringham. In August of 1992 Mr. Marshall decided to take 
back over the payroll duties. (R. at 915 and 16). 
At the end of August of 1992 the Stringhams decided to 
leave APA. The reasons for this were that Dr. Stringham needed 
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more time to work on her dissertation, and APA did not have 
the interest in drug and alcohol counseling that the 
Stringhams felt was important. (R. at 1221). Further, APA was 
having financial difficulties and payroll checks had bounced 
over the summer. Id. On September 1, 1992 the Stringhams wrote 
a letter to APA and included with that letter an accounting of 
funds that they still believed were owing to them. This 
accounting included profits that had not been paid to them as 
of that time. According to the Stringhams, $34,207.05 was owed 
to them by APA at that time. (R. at 1221 and Defendant's 
Exhibit 20). APA apparently did not agree that this money was 
owed. At or about the same time that APA received the letter 
from the Stringhams Mr. Marshall and Dr. Reisinger accused 
Robert Stringham of theft leading to the charges at hand. (R. 
at 1222) . 
As is stated above, Mr. and Dr. Stringham were handling 
the bookkeeping for APA. APA accused Mr. Stringham of 
overpaying GS Consulting in the following amounts for the 
months of August, 1991 through July of 1992 August - $87.50, 
September - $800.00, October - $925.00, November - $900.00, 
December - $962.50, January - $1,125.00, February - $1,150.00, 
March - $1,350.00, April - $1,287.50, May - $1,375.00, June -
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$1,300.00 and July $1,125.00 for a total amount of $12,387.50. 
(R. at 895-903) . The testimony of these amounts came solely 
from Mr. Art Marshall and exhibits prepared by Mr. Marshall. 
Dr. Stringham's testimony directly contradicts these amounts 
and will be discussed in more detail below. 
Mr. Stringham was further accused of under-reporting his 
income to his pension fund in order that he could receive his 
full pension. Mr. Stringham's pension fund with U. S. Steel 
and Carnegie Financial Fund provided that he would receive a 
set amount each year. In addition to that a bonus of $4,800.00 
per year was available. The bonus was only paid if Mr. 
Stringham's income during that year was under $5,500 per year. 
A partial bonus would be paid if income was between $5,500.00 
and $15,100.00. If Mr. Stringham's income exceeded $15,100.00 
in any given year, no bonus would be paid for that year. (R. 
at 1074). Mr. Stringham was accused of under-reporting his 
income to Carnegie in 1990, 1991 and 1992 in order that he 
could receive the full bonus. (R. at 1076). In 1990 Mr. 
Stringham reported an actual income of $4,800.00 and an 
estimated income for 1991 of $4,800.00. The same was reported 
in 1991. In 1992 Mr. Stringham reported an actual income of 
$3,200. (R. at 1077, 78). At trial, an individual by the name 
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of George Goldstrom, a supervisor with U.S. Steel and Carnegie 
Financial Fund testified to these amounts. (R. at 1073). 
Further, the State called Steven Ted Elder to testify as 
an expert from the Internal Revenue Service. (R. at 1054). Mr. 
Elder answered hypothetical questions regarding the legality 
of the assignment of income for tax purposes. (R. at 1066). 
Mr. Elder had never met the Stringhams (R. at 1055) and at no 
time has Mr. Stringham ever been charged with any tax related 
crime. The apparent purpose of Mr. Elder's testimony was to 
verify that assigning income was illegal for the purposes of 
Mr. Stringham's pension. However, Mr. Elder had nothing to do 
with the Carnegie Financial Fund and only testified as to what 
would be illegal for tax purposes. Mr. Collins, defense 
counsel in this matter, objected to Mr. Elder being certified 
as an expert and to his testimony in general. (R. at 1056-
1062). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is insufficient evidence to support the convictions 
of theft, communications fraud and engaging in a pattern of 
unlawful activity. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 sets forth the 
elements which must be proven in order to find a defendant 
guilty of theft. Further, the statute sets forth that it is a 
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defense to a charge of theft that the actor acted under the 
honest belief that he had a claim to the property, that he had 
the right to exercise control over the property or that he 
obtained or exercised control over the property honestly 
believing that the owner, if present would have consented. See 
§ 76-6-402(3). In the matter at hand, the evidence established 
that Mr. Stringham acted under an honest belief that he and GS 
Consulting was owed the money in the amount that was paid to 
them. The evidence showed that there was disagreement between 
the parties as to how much GS Consulting was to paid each 
month and that Mr. Stringham, who was in charge of payroll at 
the time, wrote the checks in the amount that he believed was 
proper under the parties agreement. At no point did the 
evidence establish that Mr. Stringham had the mens rea to be 
guilty of the crime of theft. 
In order to be found guilty of communications fraud 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, the defendant must 
have been found to have devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and it must 
further be proven that the defendant communicated directly or 
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indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Further, a person may not be convicted 
of communications fraud unless the pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. Id at § 76-10-1801(7). The evidence admitted at 
trial in this case established that Mr. Stringham did not have 
a scheme or artifice to defraud, and that he did not make any 
representations or omissions intentionally or knowingly. The 
evidence established that Mr. Stringham did report his $400.00 
per month income to his pension plan, and that all other 
moneys earned were earned by and paid to GS Consulting and 
that Mr. Stringham believed that he was properly reporting his 
income to the Carnegie Pension fund. Further, the only real 
testimony regarding this issue came from Ronald Harrington, a 
certified public accountant, who testified that it would be 
proper to show income earned by GS Consulting for services 
performed by Mr. Stringham if he was assisting his wife in 
doing the work. (R. at 1210) . The evidence did not establish 
that Mr. Stringham had an artifice or scheme to defraud. 
Further, the conviction for engaging in a pattern of unlawful 
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activity was based in toto, upon the allegations of theft and 
communications fraud, and therefore if there was insufficient 
evidence of those, it follows that a conviction for engaging 
in a pattern of unlawful activity is improper. 
The trial court further committed reversible error by 
mitting the testimony of an agent from the Internal revenue 
Service- The agent improperly gave an opinion as to Mr. 
Stringham's guilt and was certified to testify as an expert 
for the purposes of the communications fraud allegation 
although his only expertise was in the area of tax fraud. 
The trial court committed reversible error by not 
instructing the jury as to the criminal intent required to 
sustain a conviction for communications fraud. In order to 
convict Mr. Stringham of communications fraud, the State must 
prove every element of § 76-10-1801, including the mens rea 
requirement. The court did not give a jury instruction as to 
mens rea and therefore the conviction for three counts of 
communications fraud should be reversed. See State V. Tebbs, 
786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990). Lastly, if this Court finds 
that this issue was not properly preserved for the record then 
the Court should find that the defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
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rights. Failure to preserve the issue of not giving a jury 
instruction that goes to the mens rea of the offense is so 
clearly deficient that it violates Mr. Stringham's rights as 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, THEFT 
AND ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY. 
A. The Evidence was Insufficient in Showing that Mr. 
Stringham Possessed the Necessary Mens Rea in Order 
to be Found Guilty of Theft. 
1. Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency 
of the evidence in a criminal jury trial the threshold issue 
of statutory interpretation is decided as a matter of law. See 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d at 1313 (Utah App. 1993). With regard 
to the facts, the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from them are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. This Court will reverse 
a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of the court's 
interpretation of the statute, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. See State v. Johnson, 821 
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P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992). 
2. Discussion: Mr. Stringham was convicted of twelve 
counts of theft, six of which were second degree felonies, 
five third degree felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. 
(Record at 1-5). Theft is defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
as follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
The jury in this matter was instructed that to "obtain 
unauthorized control" means: 
In relation to property, to bring about a 
transfer of possession of that property, 
whether to the obtainer or to another 
without the authorization of the owner. 
(R. at 330). The jury was further instructed that "purpose to 
deprive" means: 
To have the conscious objective to withhold 
property permanently or to dispose of 
property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(R. at 330) . Section 76-6-402 sets forth presumptions and 
defenses to theft and reads in relevant part that: 
(3) It is a defense under this part that 
the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim 
of right to the property or 
service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief 
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that he had the right to obtain 
or exercise control over the 
property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control 
over the property or service 
honestly believing that the 
owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
The jury in this matter was instructed as to this defense. (R. 
at 319) . 
It is a fundamental element of a charge of theft that the 
defendant have the intent to steal the property of another. 
See State v. Cude, 383 P.2d 399 (Utah 1963). "If at the time 
of the taking of the property by the defendant he in good 
faith believed said property was his or if they [the jury] had 
reasonable doubt to that effect, they should acquit him." Id. 
The evidence presented to the jury in this case was 
insufficient to show that Mr. Stringham had the intent to 
steal the property of APA. To the contrary, much of the 
evidence presented supported the proposition that Mr. 
Stringham honestly believed that he was paying himself and GS 
Consulting the proper amount due to them under their numerous 
agreements with APA. 
As is stated above in the Statement of Facts, there were 
several agreements between the parties, but there is 
disagreement between the parties as to exactly what the 
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agreements consisted of, and none of these agreements were 
ever reduced to writing. The testimony of Art Marshall and 
Gale Stringham, and the exhibits offered by each of them, 
support the fact that there was mass confusion on the part of 
everyone as to the amount of money that APA was to pay the 
Stringhams. During Mr. Marshall's testimony State's Exhibit 
3 was offered and received. This exhibit, which is attached as 
Addendum C, sets forth the amounts of money paid to the 
Stringhams according to Mr. Marshall's calculations. Mr. 
Marshall testified that this chart was based upon records of 
APA (See R. at 890), however, none of these records were ever 
introduced into the record, and the only support for Exhibit 
3 is Mr. Marshall's testimony. Exhibit 3 sets forth payments 
made from August of 1991 through July of 1992. The chart is 
divided into nine columns excluding the date column. Column 
one is "Bob's Salary" which represents the $4 00.00 received by 
Mr. Stringham each month pursuant to the original 1989 
agreement. (R. at 1218). Column two is for "Bob's Financial 
Salary" and states a monthly payment of $700.00 per month. 
This represents the money actually paid to GS Consulting for 
bookkeeping. As stated above, the Stringhams understood that 
this payment was to be for $900.00 per month. (R. at 1223). 
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Column three represents "Assigned Hours". According to Mr. 
Marshall assigned hours are hours that Mr. Stringham engaged 
in counseling individuals that were billed by Dr. Stringham 
and that were paid to her at her rate. (R. at 892) . Mr. 
Marshall believed that Mr. Stringham was not supposed to be 
paid for theses additional hours. (R. at 973). Mr. Marshall 
testified during cross-examination however, that for purposes 
of billing Medicaid that counseling was to be billed under a 
qualified therapist and Mr. Stringham was only licensed to do 
alcohol counseling and for insurance purposes would not be 
allowed to bill under his name.2 (R. at 978) . Further, 
although Marshall had testified that Mr. Stringham was not to 
be paid for additional hours, he also testified that Mr. 
Stringham was to bill for services such as education classes 
and drug evaluations done in Utah County and that this was 
proper. (R. at 976) . 
Column four represents payments to GS Consulting for the 
assigned hours. According to Mr. Marshall, these were for 
hours worked by Mr. Stringham that were billed and paid to GS 
Consulting at Dr. Stringham's rate. (R. at 892 and 93). This 
2
 APA never claimed that this billing practice was improper 
vis-a-vis third parties, only that Mr. Stringham was not to be paid 
for this time. 
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claim however is not supported by anything in the record other 
than Marshall's testimony. Column five is claimed to represent 
the actual hours billed by Gale Stringham for each month. 
Again this is not supported by anything other than Marshall's 
testimony, and as will be set forth below the figures in this 
column do not match the hours that were set forth in Dr. 
Stringham's DayTimer. Column six is the amount of money that 
Dr. Stringham would have been paid at her hourly rate for the 
hours set forth in column five, if in fact that was how much 
she worked. Where Mr. Marshall derived his figure for these 
hours is unclear. Once again, Marshall testified that this 
was all based on records of APA, but these records were never 
introduced, nor was there any testimony as to what these 
records consisted of. (R. at 890). Column seven represents the 
total amount that Marshall claims should have been paid to the 
Stringhams for each month according to his calculations. 
Column eight represents the actual amount paid to the 
Stringhams each month according to Marshall's calculations and 
column nine is the difference, or the amount of the claimed 
overpayment according to Marshall. Once again there are no 
records in evidence to back up any of these figures. 
The only item in the record which shows the actual 
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amounts of money paid to Bob Stringham, Gale Stringham and GS 
Consulting is Defense Exhibit 11, attached as Addendum D. 
Exhibit 11 was introduced through Art Marshall on cross-
examination and contains copies of all of the checks written 
to Bob,- Gale and GS Consulting starting in January of 1990 and 
ending with August of 1992. (See R. at 956). Mr. Marshall 
testified that these appeared to be copies of the actual 
checks. See Id. As was brought out in the testimony, and is 
clear by examining these checks, the amount of the checks for 
no period matches the amounts set forth by Mr. Marshall in 
State's Exhibit 3. For example, in July of 1992, according to 
Mr. Marshall, the Stringhams should have been paid a total of 
$4,125.00, and that the actual payments were in the amount of 
$4,250.00. However, in looking at the actual checks for July 
of 1992, the Stringhams were paid as follows: On July 8, 1992 
Bob Stringham was paid $224.40/ on July 8, 1992 Gale Stringham 
was paid $210.38 and on July 8, 1992 GS Consulting was paid 
$3,787.50 for a total amount of $4,222.28. This figure does 
not match the one set forth in either column seven or eight of 
State's Exhibit 3. Looking at September of 1991, according to 
Mr. Marshall the Stringhams should have been paid a total of 
$4,000.00 but were in fact paid $4,800.00. In looking at the 
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actual checks in Defendant's Exhibit 11, Bob Stringham was 
paid $224.40 on September 5, 1991, Gale Stringham was paid 
$210.38 and GS Consulting was paid $2800.00 for a total of 
$3234.38. These are only two examples, however, there is not 
one month were the actual amount of the checks in Defense 
Exhibit 11 is the same as the amount that Marshall claims was 
paid in State's Exhibit 3. Marshall attempted to explain this 
discrepancy by stating that money had been taken out of the 
checks for taxes and that they do not include hours attributed 
to Gale. (R. at 958, 962). There is no further explanation or 
accounting. It is very important to note that the only 
documentation in the entire record that shows what the 
Stringhams were actually paid are the checks in Exhibit 11 and 
that these do not match the figures put forth by Art Marshall. 
Further, if in fact these checks do not include all payments 
for some reason, this is never again referred to in the course 
of the trial and there is absolutely no documentation to 
support this proposition. 
During the testimony of Gale Stringham, Defendant's 
Exhibit 27, which is attached as Addendum E, was introduced 
into evidence. Exhibit 27 is another chart which sets forth 
payments made according to the Stringhams. (R. at 1225). 
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Exhibit 27 is divided into fourteen columns as follows. Column 
one is the month the actual hours were worked, and column two 
is the month the check was issued. (R. at 1225) . Column three 
represents the amount of hours that Dr. Stringham worked each 
month according to Art Marshall and States' Exhibit 3. Dr. 
Stringham does not agree with these hours. See id. Column four 
represents the amount that Dr. Stringham should have been paid 
at her hourly rate if in fact she worked the hours set forth 
in column three. This is the same as Column 6, "Gale's 
Payment" of Exhibit 3. See Id. Column five takes column four 
and adds to that the amount that GS Consulting should have 
been paid that month based upon the agreement with APA at the 
time. This initially includes the $600.00 profit draw and the 
additional $300.00 for bookkeeping according to the Stringhams 
understanding of the agreement. Id. This increased to $1,600 
per month as of December of 1991 as GS Consulting took on 
additional responsibilities. According to the Stringhams this 
also was part of the agreement with APA. See Id. Column six 
represents the hours that Gale worked each month according to 
the records of APA which were not introduced into evidence. 
These hours are slightly higher than those set forth in 
Exhibit 3. These "hours were listed at the bottom of the pages 
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on the billing and payment ledger forms that were provided in 
discovery" according to Dr. Stringham. Id. Column seven 
represents what Gale would have been paid if in fact column 
six was accurate and column eight once again adds the 
additional $900.00 and then $1,600.00 owed to GS Consulting. 
Id. Columns nine, ten and eleven were crossed off of the 
exhibit and not introduced due to confusion as to where those 
numbers were derived from. (R. at 1226). Column twelve 
represents the amount of hours that Gale believes she actually 
worked for each month based upon what was recorded in her 
DayTimer. Column thirteen is what payment would have been 
based upon those hours and column fourteen once again adds in 
the respective $900.00 and then $1,600.00 per month payable to 
GS Consulting pursuant to the agreement as understood by the 
Stringhams. (R. at 1226). Dr. Stringham's chart does not 
include the undisputed $400.00 paid each month to Mr. 
Stringham. 
Once again, the actual checks paid out to the Stringhams 
do not match the amounts set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 27. 
Interestingly however, for most months, the amount actually 
paid is less than what Dr. Stringham testified was owed to 
them. For example, according to Exhibit 27 the checks issued 
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in October of 1991 to the Stringhams should have totaled 
$4,562.50, not including the salary of $400.00 to Mr. 
Stringham. The actual amount paid to the Stringhams that month 
including the $400.00 salary according to the actual checks 
was $4,459.78 which is $502.72 less than what should have been 
paid according to the Stringhams calculations. It appears that 
all of the checks come to slightly less than what the 
Stringhams claimed they were owed under the various agreements 
with APA. Some of the difference may be accounted for by the 
fact that taxes were taken out of some of the checks issued 
according to Mr. Marshall. (R. at 958). If this is in fact the 
case then the calculations in Defendant's Exhibit 27 are very 
close to the actual amounts paid out where as the figures in 
State's Exhibit 3 do not match the actual checks in any 
instance. 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, particularly 
when comparing the charts prepared by each party with the 
amounts paid to the Stringhams according to the checks 
submitted into the record, the only thing that is absolutely 
clear is that nobody had a very good understanding of what the 
agreements between the Stringhams and APA consisted of or 
exactly how much was to be paid. The evidence presented 
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however showed that the amounts that were actually paid were 
much closer to what the Stringhams believed the agreements to 
be than what Mr. Marshall believed the agreements to be. There 
was no other testimony presented as to how much money was to 
be paid to the Stringhams other than the testimony of an 
employee of APA who testified that it was her understanding 
that the August 1991 agreement was as stated by Mr. Marshall. 
(R. at 1044-1054). This is certainly not sufficient to show 
that Mr. Stringham intended to exercise unauthorized control 
over the property of APA with the intent to deprive them 
thereof. The question for criminal liability is not what the 
agreement actually was, but what Mr. Stringham believed it to 
be. To the contrary, the evidence showed that neither of the 
parties involved had a clear understanding of how much was to 
be paid each month to the Stringhams and that in preparing the 
checks Mr. Stringham had an honest belief that he was paying 
GS Consulting the amount that had been agreed to by the 
parties. The fact that Mr. Marshall signed all of these checks 
for a period of almost two years before deciding that Mr. 
Stringham was overpaying GS Consulting supports the fact that 
Mr. Stringham was in fact preparing the checks in the amounts 
agreed upon. (R. at 910-913). The evidence presented at trial 
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was clearly insufficient to support a conviction of theft. The 
evidence in this case is sufficiently inconclusive and/or 
inherently improbable to such a degree that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. See State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991). No reasonable jury could 
have found that Mr. Stringham intended to obtain unauthorized 
control over money that belonged to APA with the intent to 
deprive them thereof. In fact, the evidence strongly supports 
the fact that due to the mass confusion over the agreements 
between the parties that Mr. Stringham held an honest belief 
that he was writing checks to himself, his wife and GS 
Consulting in the amounts agreed upon by himself and APA. The 
jury verdict should be overturned and this matter should be 
remanded for a new trial. 
B. The Evidence was Insufficient in Showing that Mr. 
Stringham Possessed the Necessary Mens Rea in Order 
to be Found Guilty of Communications Fraud and a 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity. 
1. Standard of Review: The standard of review is as set 
forth in part A. 
2. Discussion: Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 sets forth 
the elements that must be proved in order to find a defendant 
guilty of communications fraud. Pursuant to that section, a 
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defendant must have been found to have devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money, 
property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and must further find that the defendant communicated directly 
or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). A person may not be convicted of 
communications fraud unless the pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). See also 
State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasizes that 
absent either of these mental states, a conviction for 
communications fraud is improper). 
In the matter at hand, the State alleged that Mr. 
Stringham committed communications fraud by omitting income 
which he was allegedly earning from statements sent to the 
Carnegie Pension Plan. The State alleged that Mr. Stringham 
did so in order to obtain increased pension benefits from the 
Carnegie Pension Plan. However, the evidence which was 
presented at trial establishes that the Defendant did not have 
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a scheme or artifice to defraud, and that he did not make any 
representations or omissions intentionally or knowingly. 
The State alleged that Mr. Stringham omitted income which 
he had earned by assigning income payable to him by APA to GS 
Consulting. As is set forth in detail above, Art Marshall 
testified that the Bob Stringham received a $400.00 
administrative salary per month, which he properly reported to 
the Carnegie Pension Plan. This much was confirmed by the 
testimony of Mr. George Goldstrom, a supervisor with the U.S. 
Steel and Carnegie Financial Fund. (R. at 1073)• Mr. Goldstrom 
testified that Mr. Stringham reported an income of $4,800 for 
1990, $4,800 for 1991 and $3,200 for 1992 which was the year 
the Stringhams left APA. (R. at 1077 - 78). Mr. Marshall also 
testified that the Defendant received a salary for doing the 
financial books and record keeping for the corporation. As was 
discussed in detail in part A of this section, there was 
disagreement between the parties as to exactly how much was to 
be received for this work and if the money was for work 
performed by Mr. Stringham, or for work performed by GS 
Consulting. Mr. Marshall also testified that Mr. Stringham 
provided services that were included in his wife's billable 
hours to avoid a reporting of that income to the Carnegie 
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Pension Plan. (R. at 892 - 93). The State therefore alleged 
that the Mr. Stringham had improperly assigned income to his 
wife, and that he omitted the income which he assigned to his 
wife in the statements sent to the Carnegie Pension Plan, 
thereby committing communications fraud. 
The evidence presented at trial did not establish that 
Mr. Stringham committed communications fraud. Rather, the 
evidence established that he had an honest belief that what he 
was doing was proper. Initially, Gale Stringham testified 
that GS Consulting assumed the financial bookkeeping for APA 
and that Mr. Stringham assisted her in providing those 
services to APA. Dr. Stringham testified as follows: 
A. Those agreements changed over time, too. 
Initially, the draw was money I believe it was 600 a month 
that came out as a draw. It was actually an advance on the 
profitability of the Orem office, alcohol and drug services. 
Q. Did that increase at some point? 
A. Yes, it increased because what GS Consulting did 
changed. 
Q. How much did it increase to? 
A. Umm, it went from 600, I think to 800; then to 
900, then to 1,600. But when it increased, it wasn't a draw 
that was increasing. The draw continued at 600. What happened 
is GS Consulting started taking over some of the bookkeeping 
services for APA. 
Q. Who did those bookkeeping services? 
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A. My husband and I did. 
Q. You did them together? 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 1220). Ronald Harrington, a certified public 
accountant, testified that it would be proper to show income 
earned by GS Consulting for services performed by Robert 
Stringham if he was assisting his wife in doing the work. Mr. 
Harrington testified as follows: 
Q. Now, even on a joint return the attribution of 
income on that return, is it proper for Robert Stringham to 
show on the return income of GS Consulting moneys that he 
earned -by personal services? 
A. No, unless it would be incidental to assisting 
his wife in doing the work. 
(R. at 1210). The evidence before the jury therefore 
established that the agreement to provide financial and 
bookkeeping services for APA was between APA and GS 
Consulting, and that Mr. Stringham assisted GS Consulting in 
performing those services. Further, there was no additional 
testimony presented at trial to support the allegation that 
Mr. Stringham had devised an artifice or scheme to defraud. As 
is discussed in detail below, the only other testimony was 
that of the Internal Revenue Service Agent who testified that 
assigning income in this manner would be illegal for tax 
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purposes, although Mr. Stringham was not charged with any tax 
related crimes. (R. at 1056, 66). 
It was not improper for monies to be earned in the name 
of GS Consulting and for the Mr. Stringham to omit such monies 
from his statement to the Carnegie Pension Plan. Mr. 
Stringham was working as a representative of GS Consulting. 
Further, Mr. Stringham reported the only salary that the 
testimony showed he actually collected, the $400.00 per 
month.3 Accordingly, Mr. Stringham did not have an artifice 
or scheme to defraud, and did not omit information from the 
statements given to the Carnegie Pension Plan intentionally or 
knowingly. As a result, the evidence presented at the trial 
was insufficient to convict Mr. Stringham of the charge of 
communications fraud. 
Mr. Stringham was further convicted of one count of 
engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, and of using APA 
in such a pattern. This conviction was based, in toto, upon 
the allegations of misconduct contained in Counts two through 
sixteen which allege communications fraud and theft. However, 
because there was insufficient evidence upon which to find Mr. 
Stringham guilty of communications fraud or theft, 
3
 For tax purposes income could potentially be attributed to 
Mr. Stringham. 
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accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to find that Mr. 
Stringham engaged in a pattern of unlawful activity by 
committing such alleged crimes. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE AGENT FROM THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. 
1. Standard of Review: Challenges to evidentiary rulings 
are reviewed under a deferential clear error standard. 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Discussion: During the trial in this matter the state 
called Steven Ted Elder, a special agent criminal investigator 
for the Internal Revenue Service as an expert witness. (R. at 
1054). Mr. Elder had never met, nor had he ever had any 
contact whatsoever with Mr. Stringham. He had never 
investigated Mr. Stringham, nor was he planning on 
investigating Mr. Stringham. (R. at 1055) . During voir dire by 
defense counsel, Mr. Elder testified that there were no 
criminal charges pending against Mr. Stringham relating to tax 
matters and that he was not investigating any. (R. at 1056). 
Mr. Elder did not prepare any written report in this matter 
and the sole purpose of his testimony was to answer the 
following hypothetical question posed by the state. 
If an individual, we'll call him Mr. A 
performs personal services, such as 
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accounting work, tax preparation, payroll 
preparation, filing quarterly tax returns, 
preparation of tax documents for employers, 
a compilation of payroll records, and 
clinical works such as counseling, group 
therapy individual counseling, is it lawful 
for that individual to assign income from 
those activities to a third party. 
(R. at 1066). Mr. Elder's answer to this was "no, that is not 
lawful." Id. The trial court committed reversible error in 
allowing this testimony before the jury and this error 
prejudiced the defendant. 
Defense counsel in this matter strenuously objected to 
Mr. Elder being certified as an expert, and to his testimony 
in general. (R. at 1057 - 1062, 1066). Defense counsel 
properly objected on the basis that Mr. Elder's opinion of 
whether or not the posed hypothetical is lawful or not is 
improper and irrelevant. An experts' opinion regarding guilt 
is inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). The fact that 
the question was phrased in the form of a hypothetical does 
not remedy the problem. Mr. Elder was given a hypothetical 
which consisted of the exact actions that Mr. Stringham was 
accused of and then asked to give an opinion as to whether or 
not this was illegal. This was a thinly veiled attempt to 
solicit an opinion as to Mr. Stringham's guilt and to admit 
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such opinion is clear error. 
Mr. Elder's testimony was also irrelevant. The purpose of 
the testimony was to somehow lend support to the accusation 
that Mr. Stringham had committed communications fraud by under 
reporting his income to his pension fund. Mr. Elder was an IRS 
agent. His opinion as to whether or not Mr. Stringham's 
conduct was illegal for tax purposes is completely irrelevant 
to the question of whether or not he committed communications 
fraud. This testimony was also clearly prejudicial to Mr. 
Stringham, particularly when considering the fact that Mr. 
Elder's testimony was the only testimony offered on the issue 
of communications fraud other than that of George Goldstrom 
who testified how much income Mr. Stringham had in fact 
reported. (R. at 242 - 260). The fact that Mr. Stringham's 
defense to this charge was that he believed it was legal to 
assign income to GS Consulting under the circumstances 
presented and therefore did not have the requisite intent to 
commit communications fraud was not contradicted by any 
witness other than Mr. Elder. For that reason alone it is 
clear that Mr. Elder's testimony had a prejudicial affect on 
the outcome of this matter. 
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In Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah App. 1994), the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that a doctor could not testify as 
an expert in an area outside of his expertise. 
The trial court is given discretion under 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence "to 
determine the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and to determine if the expert 
witness is qualified to give an opinion on 
a particular matter." Robb v. Anderton, 863 
P.2d 1322, 1326 (Utah Aoo. 1993) (quoting 
Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 
Aoo. 1991)). In exercising that discretion, 
we believe a trial court should require a 
medical expert witness to demonstrate 
familiarity with the applicable standard of 
care based on more than just a review of 
the documents in the particular case, 
(citation omitted). By definition, an 
expert is one who possesses a significant 
depth and breadth of knowledge on a given 
subject. To allow a doctor in one 
specialty, retained as an expert witness, 
to become an "expert" on the standard of 
care in a different medical specialty by 
merely reading and studying the documents 
in a given case invites confusion, error, 
and a trial fraught with unreliable 
testimony. 
Dikeou at 945. In the case at hand, Mr. Elder did not go so 
far as to review the case or any documentation as did the 
doctor in Dikeou. His testimony was based simply on what he 
felt was illegal in his particular field. Allowing Mr. Elder 
to testify as an expert witness in this matter was clear error 
and resulted in extreme prejudice to the defendant and an 
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unfair trial. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE CRIMINAL 
INTENT REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD. 
Standard of Review: An appeal challenging the refusal to 
give a jury instruction presents a question of law for which 
the reviewing court grants no particular deference. Ong Int' 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp. , 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
Further, because the general rule is that an accurate 
instruction on the basic elements of an offense is essential, 
failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error 
that can never be considered harmless. State v. Souza, 846 
P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Discussion: Mr. Stringham was convicted of three 
counts of second degree communications fraud . (Record at 47-
4 9). Communications fraud is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801 as follows: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme 
or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything 
of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty 
of: 
. . . (d) a second degree felony when the 
41 
value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $5,000 . . . 
(7) A person may not be convicted under 
this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material 
omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with 
a reckless disregard for the truth. 
In State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990), Thomas 
Tebbs challenged the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute. He argued that the statute violated his right 
to due process because it does not require the state to prove 
his criminal intent as an element of his crime but rather 
places on him the burden to disprove such an intent. He 
argued that because subsection (1) of the statute does not 
specifically identify any particular culpable mental state as 
one of the elements of the crime, subsection (7) can only be 
read to place that burden on the defendant. 
The court found that "[i]t is unfortunate that the 
Legislature worded the communications fraud statute as it did, 
but we believe that statute can fairly be interpreted to avoid 
unconstitutionality." Tebbs at 779. The court held that "the 
communications fraud statu[t]e (sic) requires the state to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had either the 
knowledge of the falsity, or a reckless disregard for the 
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truth, of any ^pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions7 made by the defendant. Subsection (7) 
merely emphasizes that absent either of these mental states, 
a conviction for communications fraud is improper." State v. 
Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990). 
To convict Mr. Stringham of communications fraud, the 
State was required to prove every element of § 76-10-1801, 
including the mens rea requirement set forth by State v. Tebbs 
and embodied in subsection (7) of the statute. Here, there 
was no jury instruction given on this mens rea requirement. 
Defense counsel requested a mens rea instruction but the trial 
court did not give it. Accordingly, Mr. Stringham's 
conviction for three counts of communications fraud should be 
reversed. 
It is true that on the record defense counsel took no 
exception to jury instructions as given. However, because the 
omission of a jury instruction addressing the mens rea is so 
significant and fundamental that an objection was not 
necessary because without such an instruction, Mr. Stringham 
was denied due process. In State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 
(Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a 
similar issue. In that case, Mr. Turner argued that the jury 
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instructions given shifted the burden of proof of innocence to 
Turner, thereby violating his fourteenth amendment federal 
constitutional right to have the State prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element of the offenses charged. The 
court agreed with Turner and held that Turner's failure to 
object to the instructions at the trial court level did not 
prevent the court from reversing Turner's conviction. The 
court held that: 
The presumption of innocence embodied in 
our concept of due process is at the heart 
of this case. The due process clause 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime charged (citations omitted). 
Although trial counsel for Turner failed to 
challenge the defective instructions, 
Turner has claimed a substantial and 
effective denial of due process on direct 
appeal. The erroneous instructions did 
exclude Turner from due process. He has 
been sentenced to serve a total of 0 to 15 
years in the Utah State Prison. The 
circumstances of this case are 
extraordinary, so we are compelled to 
correct the constitutional error and the 
consequences imposed on Turner, despite his 
lack of objection at trial. 
^Notwithstanding a party's failure to 
object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice.' Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). State 
v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983). 
See State v. Cobo, 60 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
1936). 
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State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), Because 
there was no jury instruction given on the mens rea element 
required to convict Mr. Stringham under the communications 
fraud statute, the convictions under that statute should be 
reversed. 
IV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT FIND THAT ISSUE III WAS 
PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT, 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT. 
1. Standard of Review: The performance and prejudice 
prongs of ineffectiveness of counsel claims involve mixed 
questions of law and fact which are reviewed de novo. United 
States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1989). 
2. Discussion: The standard used to determine whether or 
not a defendant has been deprived of the right of effective 
assistance of counsel is articulated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 
(1984) . The Strickland Court put forth a two-part test which 
must be met in order to find ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
First, the defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ^counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance 
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prejudiced the defense. 
Id. at 687. 
In the case at hand, if the court finds the Defense 
counsel did not properly preserve the jury instruction issue 
discussed above, then counsel's performance was clearly 
deficient under the standard set forth in Strickland. A 
failure to make an objection on the record to jury 
instructions that fail to instruct the jury on the mens rea 
required to make a conviction under the communications statute 
is clearly so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
xcounsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Further, if in fact counsel's failure to object was a waiver 
of defendant's rights it certainly prejudiced Mr. Stringham. 
The jury convicted Mr. Stringham without knowing Mr. Stringham 
had to have a culpable mental state in order to be convicted. 
This is clearly prejudicial. If this Court determines that 
counsel did not properly preserve this issue below then there 
must be a determination that the defendant was deprived 




The defendant/appellant, Robert Stringham, respectfully 
requests that this Court find that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crimes of theft, 
communications fraud and engaging in a pattern of unlawful 
activity. Further, this Court should find that the trial court 
committed reversible error in allowing the expert testimony of 
the agent from the Internal Revenue Service, and that 
reversible error was committed in not instructing the jury 
regarding intent for the crime of communications fraud. This 
matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JtW& day of February, 
1997. 
JEROME l/. MOONEY 
WENDY M. LEWIS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
1996 B ! 18 AH 3:28 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT j ^ C 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
 nnnca l frn , . /> , C 





MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
CASE NO. 941400259 
DATE: June 14, 1996 
JUDGE: BOYD L.PARK 
REPT. BY: Vonda Bassett, CSR 
CLERK: NAH 
This matter came before the Court on defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and 
for pronouncement of judgment on the above-named defendant on the charge(s) of: Count I: 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a Third Degree Felony; Counts II - IV: Communication 
Fraud, Third Degree Felonies; Counts V; Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Counts VI 
- XVI: Theft, Class A Misdemeanors. Deputy County Attorney Craig Madsen appeared 
for and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present. Appearing for the 
defendant was Jerome Mooney. 
On the 19th day of January, 1996, the defendant was found guilty by a jury to the 
above-named crime(s) and the matter was referred to the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department for a presentence investigation and report. The report has now been received 
and considered by the Court. Counsel has been made aware of the recommendation. 
Mr. Mooney addressed the court regarding his motion. Mr. Madsen responds. 
Rebuttal by Mr. Mooney. 
The Court denies defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and feels that it is a 
matter for the appellate court. The Court also finds that restitution should be handled as a 
civil matter since there is a pending civil file. If the restitution issue has not been resolved 
in the civil case within 24 months of today's date, this court will hold a restitution hearing to 
determine the amount. 
•-0CG 474C 
Mr. Mooney addressed the court regarding the pending 402 motion. Mr. Madsen 
responds and objects to the 402 motion being granted at this time. 
The Court grants the 402 motion as to all counts. 
Mr. Mooney and Mr. Madsen addressed the court regarding the recommendation. 
The defendant addressed the court. 
Mr. Mooney requests that the disposition be stayed pending the appeal. Mr. 
Madsen objects. 
The Court denies Mr. Mooney's request that the disposition be stayed. 
There being no legal reason having been shown why sentence should not be 
pronounced, and the court having granted a 402 motion as to all counts, it is the judgment of 
the Court on Counts I - IV, that the defendant be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years on each count. On Count V. that the 
defendant be sentenced to the Utah County Jail for a period of six (6) months; and on Counts 
VI - XVI. that the defendant be sentenced to the Utah County Jail for a period of one (1) 
year on each count. Said sentences are to run concurrent one with the other and the jail term 
may be served at the Utah State Prison. Execution of the sentence is suspended and the 
defendant is placed on probation for a period of 36 months upon the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. Defendant is ordered to enter into an agreement with the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department and comply strictly with the terms of probation. 
2. Defendant is ordered to make himself/herself available to the Adult Probation and 
Parole and to the Court when requested to do so. 
3. Defendant is ordered to not violate the laws of the United States, the State of Utah, the 
laws of any state or any municipality. 
4. Defendant is ordered to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail and be given credit for 
"good time." Defendant is ordered to report to the Utah County Jail on Sunday. July 
14. at 8:00 a.m. to begin serving his jail sentence. If the jail is unable to accept the 
defendant when he reports due to overcrowding the jail is to set a definite time for the 
defendant to return and accept him at that time without further order of the court. 
*JS*.C A*? A A 
Defendant is ordered to pay a monthly supervision fee of $30 at the discretion of Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
Defendant is ordered to complete 500 hours of alternative community service within 18 
months. If the defendant fails to complete the community service hours he will serve 
the remainder of the 90 days which Adult Probation and Parole recommended. 
Defendant is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000 or complete 400 hours of 
alternative community service. Defendant is ordered to pay a surcharge in the amount 
of $1,700. 
Defendant is not allowed to be in any position of financial trust or have any other 
fiduciary responsibilities. 
The Court retains jurisdiction to make further orders as necessary. 
Dated this 14th day of June, 1996. 




^.0.1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Pen-
allies* 
fl) Any P^ 1"8011 w^° kas devised any scheme or artifice to 
^Egod another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
jJJJJjug of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
JJjpggentations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
2nunicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
JJLT« for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
5Jr^ce is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be ob-
tained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be ob-
tained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, 
"money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the prop-
erty, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the 
scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of 
something of monetary value. 
fc) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
ibeection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all 
property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by 
(to scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
wyided in Subsection dXe). 
{3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary 
dement of the offense described in Subsection (1). 
j4 | An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
Scribed in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person 
property, money, or thing of value is not a necessaiy element 
tf the offense. 
*[5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of 
mciiting or concealing a scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
bud 
[6); (a) Tb communicate as described in Subsection (1) 
means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to 
give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit 
information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not lim-
ited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, tele-
vision, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
IJjD A person may not be convicted under this section unless 
^pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
ras made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, 
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MONIES DUE BASED ON HOURS CALCULATED 
MONTH MONTH MARSHALL DUE i PLUS MARSHALL 
HOURS CHECK EXHIBIT 3 
DUE® PLUS 
25.00 CNTRCT BACKUP 25.00 CNTRCT 
GALE DUE@ PLUS 
DAYTIMER 25.00 CNTRCT 
EARNED ISSUED GALE GALE 
AUG-91 SEP-91 79.50 1987.50 2887.50 100.50 2512.50 3412.50 94.00 2350.00 3250.00 
SEP-91 OCT-91 102.00 2550.00 3450.00 116.00 2900.00 3800.00 ^^^112.00 
^—-304.00 
118.50 2962.50 4562.50 
OCT-91 NOV-91 94.00 2350.00 3950.00 102.00 2550.00 4150.00 106.50 2662.50 4262.50 
OCT-91 NOV-91 0.00 0.00 0.00 ^ 1 0 6 0 00 0.00 0.00 
OCT-91 NOV-91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NOV-91 DEC-91 98.00 2450.00 4050.00 108.00 2700.00 4300.00 108.00 
DEC-91 JAN-92 73.00 1825.00 3425.00 75.00 1875.00 3475.00 1< LOO 
45t)0.00 
3550" 00 
109.00 2725.00 4325.00 
84.00' 2100.00 3700.00 
JAN-92 FEB-92 97.50 2437.50 4037.50 102.50 2562.50 4162.50 ^TTf3.50 2587 JO Stt3?»50 124.00 3100.00 4700.00 
FEB-92 MAR-92 97.00 2425.00 4025.00 100.00 2500.00 4100.00 ^EPQflO .00 aigo.oo 101.00 2525.00 4125.00 
MAR-92 APR-92 107.00 2675.00 4275.00 107.00 2675.00 4275.00 
APR-92 MAY-92 120.00 3000.00 4600.00 127.50 3187.50 4787.50 
Q24.00 
So 50 
110.00 2750.00 4350.00 
127.50 3187.50 4787.50 
MAY-92 JUN-92 88.00 2200.00 3800.00 92.00 2300.00 3900.00 00 .00 94.00 2350.00 3950.00 
MAY-92 JUN-92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49QP.00 0.00 0.00 
JUN-92 JUL-92 73.50 1837.50 3437.50 87.50 2187.50 3787.50 ..50 3787 50 89.50 2237.50 3837.50 
JUL-92 AUG-92 75.00 1875.00 3475.00 83.00 2075.00 3675.00 2g7J.OO 3675 00 80.00 2000.00 3600.00 
JUL-92 AUG-92 0.00 0.00 81.00 2025.00 3625.00 ? 0.00 / (o n ( 8 12. 13 '<-/ 
